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THE MAKING OF COLONIAL ZIMBABWE: SPECULATION AND
VIOLENCE 1890-1902
Ian Phimister
'The relationship between a good or bad share
market on the one side and a British Colony
in the stage of tender infancy on the other
is to be studied, if anywhere, in this country
of Rhodesia, Rhodesia is a country which,
. almost avowedly is intended to be built up, or
at least forced upward, by aid. of gold mining
and land dealing on the £1 share limited lia-
bility principle1 {Rhodesia Herald, 1898)
The immediate genesis of colonial Zimbabwe grew out
of the discovery of the main gold reef on the T-Jitwatersrand
in 1886. When news of the find reached the diamond mining
centre of Kimberley, reaction was mixed. Some entrepreneurs,
particularly those bruised in the on-going fight to amalga-
mate the diamond industry, made their way as fast as possible
to the Rand. Others, with much less reason to gamble, like
Cecil Rhodes, held back. Rhodes1 scepticism, rooted in the
recent failure of the Barberton goldfield and the crash of
its stock exchange, was confirmed by the professional opinion
of his mining expert. 'If I were to ride over these reefs
in America', said Gardner Williams, 'I would not get off my
horse to look at them'.1 And when- Rhodes finally did act,
his luck was as poor as the advice he had previously received
Gold Fields of South Africa Limited, registered in London
at the start of 1887, ended up with the most unpromising
sections of the Rand. Returns from the company's first
mining operations were so discouraging that Rhodes, and
his fellow managing director, Charles Rudd, hastily trans-
ferred the bulk of Gold Fields* capital into diamond shares.
As they pondered their next move, it was clear that the
purchase of additional and better Rand properties would be
ruinously expensive. In any case, their faith in the new
goldfield was shaken. 'We have come to the conclusion1,
wrote Rudd in August 1888, 'that our best chance of a big
thing is to try and make some terms with Lobengula for a
concession for the whole of his country',2
The legendary riches of Ophir had long been rumoured
to lie between the Limpopo and the Zambesi, and for over
twenty years had attracted the fluctuating interest of
individual concession - seekers and foreign governments-
In 1867, Karl Mauch, an amateur geologist and traveller,
regaled readers of the Transvaal Argus with descriptions
of the 'vast extent and beauty1 of the goldfields he had
recently seen in southern Zambesia, His account of 'white
reefs of auriferous quartz glistening in the sun as they
cropped out here and there' was repeated and amplified in
Britain, where The Times published a Bank of England assav
of Mauch's quartz samples showing 1185 ozs. gold to the
ton!3 Although the ensuing 'rush' to the Tati district
and the 'northern goldfields1 of Mashonaland quickly ebbed
in the face of disappointing results and staaaering transport
costs, and turned instead to the rewards of Kimfeerley,
interest in the 'road to the north' and the 'far interior1
never entirely disappeared. It was nourished, at different
times and for different purposes, by missionaries, by Rhodes
himself, and by British imperial considerations of supremacy
and strategy. The German annexation o* Oamaraland and Nama-
gualand in 1884 drew Britain northwards into Tswana terri-
tory between the Transvaal and the west coast, but official
interest in the lands across the Limpopo continued to be
muted and fitful. Even Rhodes was equivocal, blowing hot
and cold on northern expansion. He thought the evidence
of mineral wealth in Lobengula's domains, was unconvincino,
and in July 1885 described the region as 'fever-stricken'
and unfit for settlement.1*
From 1886, however, the pace of events quickened as
developments on the Rand began to transform the face of South-
ern Africa, in the process dramatically enhancing the
importance of the 'far interior1. Glowing reports from
visitors to Matabeleland had caused Rhodes to chanae his
mind about the territory's potential even as his Gold Fields
company was left on the fringes of the first Rand boom, while
at the same time the threat seemingly posert to British
supremacy by the magnitude of the gold discoveries in the
Transvaal encouraged the Imperial authorities to become
increasingly solicitous of Cape colonial aspirations. At
Rhodes1 prompting, Lobengula was persuaded to sign a treaty
in February 1888 which effectively made Matabeleland a
sphere of British influence, and eight months later.
Imperial officials again cooperated closely with Rhodes'
emissaries in securing the P.udd Concession- This grant
of 'all metals and minerals situated and contained in mv
kingdom... together with full power to do all things that
they may deem necessary to win and procure the same•,extrac-
ted with consummate duplicity, was soon afterwards repudiated
by Lobengula. His protests, stifled by Rhodes1 henchman,
Leander Starr Jameson, and delayed by officials in Cape Town ,
were ultimately ignored by the Imperial Government. Instead,
the concession, greatly helped by the pragmatic amalgamation
of competing commercial interests and the careful assembly
of a prestigious board of directors/ was accepted as the
basis for the Royal Charter of 29 October 1889. Empowered
by the Charter to'make treaties and promulgate laws, as well
as to maintain a police force and undertake public works',
Rhodes' British South Africa Company lost little time in
recruiting an invasion force. To the undoubted satisfaction
of Rhodes and his backers, many of its members came from the
Rand, then gripped by depression because the mines had struck
a refractory sulphide zone from which it was difficult and
expensive to recover gold. An initial highly risky plan for
a direct assault on the Ndebele was discarded in favour of
an expedition to the goldfields of Mashonaland, ostensibly
within the terms of the concession, but actually beyond
Lobengula's rule. In June 18 90 the ^pioneer column1,
fortified with maxim guns and a steam-powered searchlight
to ward off night attacks, moved warily northwards to the
highveld of Mashonaland. There, at the end of September,
the column was disbanded and prospectors swarmed into
the countryside to locate the 'Second Rand1.5
Because it was confidently assumed that 'several new
Johannesburgs16 would soon be found, Rhodes and the B.S.A.
Company thought that actual mining would be far beyond the
resources of individual prospectors and syndicates. Develop-
ment would necessarily be in the hands of large capital and
regulations were framed accordingly.7 For its part, the
Chartered Company did not seek direct involvement in produc-
tion. As the primary representative of financial and spec-
ulative capital, the B.S.A. Company set the terms of entry
and sought to hold the ring for the operations of industrial
and merchant capital; it aimed to provide*an administrative
and transport infrastructure, but would otherwise take its
profits through shareholding in other companies.8 Under
the mining law, both prior right to company flotation and
fifty percent of such vendors scrip were claimed for the
Charter. It is 'an enormous thing1, explained Rhodes to his
London Board, as the system 'practical.lv means ... we shall
get half the minerals of the countr"1.9
At first, hopes were high as nrospectors rushed from
one reputedly rich area to another. 'Everybody was going to
make money quickly and everybody meant to meet everybody
else at Chicago (Trade Exhibition) - "Chicago '93!"' .
Even dogs were called Concession and Syndicate by owners
convinced that they were 'made men1.10 By the third
week of October 1890 some 3OO men were prospecting the
country around forts Salisbury, Charter and Victoria, and
the favoured region of Hartley Hills soon bristled with
claim pegs. Wonderful reports of Mashonaland began to cir-
culate in the Cape Colony where tales of 'grass ten feet
high, of trees sixty feet in circumference, of mysterious
ruins1 lost nothing in the telling. 'The whole country1, it
was said, 'was one vast gold-reef1.11 The *.S.A. Company,
anxious to ensure that equally wondrous stories reached
investors in Britain, relied on the well-connected Sir John
Willoughby to publicise reports of gold reefs 'averaging
four feet in thickness, bearing three or four ounces to
the ton1-12 Visitors entering the country for the first
time a little later on and struck by the contrast with
Bechuanaland, were still more euphoric, 'Here one woulrt
never be surprised to come across the roc's egg of Sinbad1,
wrote the archaeologist Theodore Bent, 'or the golden valley
of Ras/elas; the dreams of the old Arabian story-tellers
A
here seem to have a reality'-13
For many prospectors, though, much of the romance washed
away in the tremendous rainy season of 1890/1. Supplies,
already irregular because of the inability of the Bechuanaland
Trading Association to cope with the contract won from
friends in the B.S.A. Company,11* dwindled rapidly when
swollen rivers cut communication with the south for over
three months. The rains brought malaria which was bad enough,
but even worse was the perennial menace of horse sickness
which came close to leaving the whites with nothing but ox-
drawn transport. At Fort Victoria in 1891 travellers could
see 'the hundred and fifty saddles placed in rows within the
fort, which had once belonged to the hundred and fifty horses
brought up by the pioneers, all of which had died of horse
sickness,115 Nor did the sideways lunge of the Chartered
Company for Manicaland in the first half of 1891 do anything
much to dispel the gloom settling over the prospectors. Al-
though systematic mining work was severely handicapped by
lack of equipment, enough had been done to establish the
poverty of local goldfields. There were no alluvial deposits
worth mentioning and the numerous shafts and pits left by
precolonial Shona mining operations had begun to foster the
uneasy suspicion that the 'ancients1 had 'picked the eyes'
out of the country.
But as the rivers went down, so confidence returned.
Fresh gold-seekers poured into the country, certain that
they would succeed where others had failed. 'V?e are having
lots of difficulties, but no doubt marble palaces and steam-
yachts will be the result of present inconvenience1, wrote
one young miner. 16 'Many of the new chums', observed Percy
8Fitzpatrick, 'seem to think that it is going to be the
Rand game over again, and that all you want is a trap and
pair and compass, and then the cheque.117 More important,
however, was what London and Kimberley capital, prominently
represented by Lord Randolph Churchill and Alfred Beit,
would make of the new country. And they reached a very
different conclusion. Mining experts were sent to various
goldfields and when their unflattering impressions became
widely known, the country slid swiftly into an economic
depression.18 By November 1891, everything was 'stagnation.
Economy the order of the day in every household... The
whole concern has the appearance of (an) enormous bladder un-
duly inflated and suddenly pricked. One might say that
the experts were the people who have pricked it1.19 The
London board of the B.SiA. Company, already nervous about
the state of the company's finances, saw its shares fall
below their par value of £1 for the first time in December.
Ten months previously they had been worth over F.2 each.20
With little prospect of fresh capital entering Mashonaland,
the Chartered Company found its original capitalisation of
one million pounds ludicrouslv small in relation to the
demands being made on it, and teetered on the verge of
bankruptcy.
The rescue operation which followed took several forms.
Subsidies from friends and a vigorous policy of retrenchment
first lessened the risk of ignominious collapse and then
provided a breathing space for the Company in ,the course of
1892. De Beers and Gold Fields of South Africa were induced
to make a series of investments/ loans and grants which went
a long way to keep the B.S.A. Companv afloat.21 Simultaneous-
ly, cash expenditure was slashed, causing what was left of
the Company's civil administration to be heavily dependent
on settler magistrates, field cornets and burgher forces.22
In its place a system of extravagant land concessions was
used both to reward companies and individuals for past ser-
vices and to encourage speculative interest in Mashonaland.23
Sir John Willoughby's calculated defiance of the Portuguese
at Beira in 1891 was rewarded with 600,000 acres.24 nunbar
Moodie, who had accompanied Jameson on his abortive mission
to Gungunyana of the Gaza, was allowed to carve out a fiefdon
of over 60,000 acres in the Melsetter district after his
trek to the Eastern Highlands in 1892-3,25 and equallv huge
grants were lavished on the Copenhagen (Mashonaland) Company,
on Chartered Goldfields Limited, on Moore's Rhodesia Conces-
sion, and on others courted by the Chartered Administration.26
Steps were also taken to counter the damage done by
unfavourable publicity. Doubts were cast on Churchill's com-
petence and journalists were paid to keen the 'New Eldorado1
before the investing public.27 A handbook published in 1892
unblushingly claimed that 'an uninterrupted gold belt extends
from the Umtali Valley south-westerly to Victoria, which may
possibly prove to be connected with the Tati gold-fields1,28
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while Rhodes himself heloed to prepare the B.S.A. Company's
annual report which disingenuously described Mashonaland
as 'a country with reefs in all directions.129 A virtue
was even made of the vice of the territory's isolation.
The slow and expensive transport system which crippled
mining activity wasn't without its advantages. For long
periods of time it left the outside world at the mercy of
information which reached it along the Company's telegraph
line. The melancholy fact that less than 800 ozs. gold
were produced in the whole of 1892 was obscured by insistent
claims to the contrary. 'Everywhere new finds are occurr-
ing daily', trumpeted Jameson in May 1893; 'Crushinas every-
where successful. Wonderful developments in every district.
Reefs certainly improve as depth increases.130
The overall result of these different policies was to
create a highly combustible mixture of settler and speculat-
ive interests which was soon ignited by a clash with the
Ndebele near Fort Victoria in July 1893. Local whites, em-
bittered by stagnant economic conditions and prospects, were
outraged when raiding parties abruptly closed the few work-
ing mines and farms by killing some of their labourers and
causing the rest to flee. But Jameson, who had hurried down
from Salisbury/ was moved less by the howls of the settlers
for war, than by the fact that the Ndebele near the town
were easily shot and dispersed by a small local force.31
This suggested the possibility of a cheap confrontation.
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even as news of the Ndebele raid caused Chartered shares
to fall rapidly on the London market. After momentary hesi-
tation, Rhodes and Jameson raised settler columns on the
promise of land and mining claims yet to be won, and set
out to manufacture a war for the seizure of Matabeleland.32
As Jameson well knew, 'the getting of Matabeleland open
would give us a tremendous lift in shares and everything
else. The fact of its being shut up gives it an immense
value both here and outside-'33 With the bulk of the Ndebele
army either away north of the Zambesi or incapacitated by
smallpox contacted in the same campaign, the invaders had
little difficulty in breaking through to Bulawayo. Lobengula
withdrew towards the Zambesi where he soon afterwards died.
Satisfied that their conquest was complete, Signatories of
the B.S.A, Company sat down that Christmas to dine off 'Lob-
engula 's peacocks and a plum pudding sent from England.,'31*
'The whole affair1, noted a Chartered employee, had been a
'good piece of business.'35
For roughly two years after the end of the war, the
B.S.A. Company basked in unaccustomed favour and prosperity.
Within months of the conquest it was reported that 'a sum of
over half a million has . . . been subscribed in cash by
independent Companies', and as this trend accelerated in
1895, the number of development companies in the country
rose to about 200, while on the Bulawayo stock exchange
Chartered shares changed hands at £8.17.6. Altogether,
well in excess of- £15 million of nominal capital was*
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registered in this period.36 Company interest swung west-
wards and for a while Mashonaland was 'practically deserted'.
37
 By August 1894, Bulawayo, whose generous proportions
were planned with one eye firmly fixed on overseas share-
markets, already boasted over one hundred generalA^ tt#tfBa,
three banks, twelve hotels, three newspapers, twenty six
share brokers and nine solicitors. The whiskey-soaked frus-
tration and wretchedness of the last few years in Mashonaland
were swept away as the town's 2000-plus whites, cossetted
by the novelty of. electric light and buoyed up by tales of
successful prospectors who bathed in champagne, flung them-
selves into 'the fascinating pursuit of easily gotten
wealth.'38
The boom was almost exclusively speculative as opuosed
to industrial in character. Although partlv based on over-
estimation of the region's mineral resources, local condi-
tions were intimately dependent on the Rand boom of 1394-5.
'The moment is usually in these matters of much more importance
than the thing1, observed the National Review in 1895. 'It
would be much easier ... to sell desert sand for gold reef
when a Johannesburg had cleared the way and roused the enthus-
iasm than to dispose of a Golconda in cold blood and to an
uninterested public.'39 This close association of the two
sharemarkets thus enabled speculators to redirect capital
for the partial resuscitation of the previously discredited
Mashonaland goldfields *  ° and allowed the local boom to
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continue undisturbed even after the failure of Matabeleland
to disgorge a major goldfield. The market was one where
insiders made money, and where 'for nine months of each
year' the development of the country's gold mines was
'gravely performed by cable and telegraph.'1*1
As 'the real gold mine was at Home, in the pocket
of the British Public',"2 no serious attempts were made
either to advance railway construction or even to bring
most mines anywhere near production. The trick was turned
by other means, chiefly by the issue of alluring company
prospectuses- It sufficed that thousands of gold claims
were pegged and millions of acres of land were alienated
to companies such as Sabi Ophir Mining, to the wonderfully
named La Concorde and City and Suburban {Matabeleland)
Gold Development, and to hundreds more all scrambling for
the favour of investors. "*3 Perhaps the largest single mar-
ket coup of the time was pulled off by"the inner circle of
the B.S.A. Company itself. They had come 'very close to
defrauding1 their shareholders by keeping the Rudd Conces-
sion in their own hands, but this was now sold to the
Chartered Company for one million of its shares, an exchange
which was worth millions of pounds on the rising market,1*1*
'There is a certin deadly fascination in the game1, concluded
the National Review, 'It is so big, so thorough: half a
dozen acres of desert land at one end and two hundred thous-
money
and pounds of English/at the other... The day of exposure
1 4 •
must come, of course, some time or other; it will be bad
— for people who are in it, but it will be all right
for those who have made their pile and cleared out ... That
is what they say, and they encourage each other to make the
utmost of the golden opportunity. Round the bars of the
Maxim or Charter they drink to their friends at home and
swear to show them that they "are not out here for their
health"1. "s
Towards the end of 1894, with the boom picking up
momentum, Rhodes and Jameson went off to England where
their time was pleasantly divided between whipping up the
boil and the froth of speculative capital and accepting
honours. Rhodes, received by the Queen, drew a crowd which
blocked traffic when he congratulated the bemused share-
holders of the Chartered Company on possessing a country
with 'hundreds of miles of mineralized veins. ft*6 For his
part, Jameson, newly resplendent as a Commander of the Bath,
was feted at a banquet and meeting of.the Imperial Institute
presided over by the Prince of Wales. Matabeleland and
Mashonaland, declared Jameson, not only were rich in gold
but were blessed with coal and iron and '100,000 fat, sleek
cattle1 to prove their pastoral value. fA happy combination',
remarked The Times next morning, 'of Canaan, Ophir and the
Black Country1.1*7 V7hat The Times did not know, however,
and what Rhodes and Jameson omitted to tell their distingui-
shed hosts, was that some time previously they had realised
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that the region's gold prospects were distinctly modest.
In August-September 1894, John Hays Hammond/ Consolidated
Goldfields1 famous mining expert, had been invited to
inspect Chartered territory in the company of Rhodes and
other notables in the B.S.A. Company stable. His visit
had emphasised that the real whereabouts of the 'second
Rand1 lay in the deep levels of the Rand itself - the
economic and political implications of which were not lost
on his audience - and not in the very different quartzite
reefs of Mashonaland and Matabeleland. **B These would re-
quire extensive development work to establish their values,
and to meet this consideration, the B.S.A. Company passed
new legislation in 1895 which aimed at nudging mining
companies into continuous development of their properties.1*9
Tied to this tentative encouragement of industrial
capital were further salvoes in the process of primitive
accumulation. Because the essential purpose of the Char-
tered Administration was to provide the minimum conditions
for the more or less orderly accumulation of capital, the
Company had lost little time in trying to assert its autho-
rity over those Shona polities it could reach. An initial
policy of seeking treaties with leading Shona paramounts
was hastily dropped, however, when it risked exposing the
limited extent of the Rudd Concession. The B.S.A. Company
instead confined itself to occasional patrols, while
consolidating its shaky position against threats from
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Portugal and the Transvaal, with the result that the exten-
sion of its rule over the Shona was extremely gradual and
uneven. To a certain extent, the newcomers, like the Portu-
guese before them, were simply absorbed into existing poli-
tical patterns. Some Shona, for example, began involving
whites in succession disputes or enlisting their help in
raids for cattle, while others such as Mutasa of Manvika
maintained an aloof independence by playing on the rivalries
of the B.S.A. Company, the Portuguese and in this particu-
lar case, the Beningfield Syndicate. Still other rulers,
like Chivi and Zimuto in south-western MashonaJand, care-
fully interposed the Chartered Company between themselves
and the Ndebele, as they sought to make good their indepen-
dence from both.50
The other side of the coin, though, was that while the
highly localised nature of Shona political and social organ-
isation could provide substantial room for manoeuvre, it
also meant that individual groups were vulnerable to the
concentration of B.S.A- Company force against them. S1
Intermittent Company challenges to Shona sovereignty in
the period 1891-3 were thus more often successful than not,
as people in different areas ran foul of the Chartered Ad-
ministration's growing determination to demonstrate the
sacredness.of white lives .and property.52 Murder, theft
and what the whites perceived as insolence and insubordina-
tion were promptly countered by murder and theft on an
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intimidating scale, most spectacularly by the para-military
police expeditions of 1892. One particularly notorious
incident which began with the theft of a white trader's
goodsi ended with the deaths of twenty-three Africans and
the confiscation of forty seven cattle.53 Near Charter, a
large village attacked by white policemen was soon after-
wards found to be 'completely deserted, the natives having
fled in terror from the outrages committed upon them ...
I walked among the silent dwellings, and found in-one the
decomposed corpse of a woman, apparently about twenty-five
years of age. The whole scene was sad and sickening in
the extreme1.5" On yet another occasion, a headman in
the Mazoe district who argued that 'his men were not going
to (be forced to) work for white men and that if Police
came he would fire on them1, felt the full weight of 'Chata
ro1 (Chartered Law). He was arrested, fine^. three cattle
and six goats, and given fifty lashes 'administered in the
presence of a good number of his men, besides people belong-
ing to other kraals1.55
This struggle to subject the Shona to the Chartered
Administration's political will at first had no real para-
llel in the narrowly economic sphere, where the search
for gold and the speculative obsessions of the colonists
and companies generated only small and sporadic labour
needs. Africans certainly were 'caught at dawn1 and forced
to work for whites, 56 but in fact more widespread was the
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tendency towards accelerated coramoditisation, as increasing
numbers of people responded to the fluctuating market demands
of the settlers. In 1891, Fitzpatrick found the Shona
'anxious to barter and quicker to trade and more eager for
business than any native I have yet seen. So keen are they
on business1, he added, 'and so quick to perceive an opening,
that they have broken up fresh ground, and planted double
crops this year, in order to supply the rush of the white
men1.57 This trend was sustained in 1892, by which time
prices had risen near the towns where the demand for pro-
duce was greater, and by 1895 the Wedza district was exporting
large quantities of grain to mines in Matabeleland.58 Before
the war of 1893, thousands of cattle were sold by the Ndebele
in response to the 'acute demand for slaughter and transport
oxen at Salisbury and Victoria'. Traders commonlv drove
herds of between 100-200 head and this traffic continued
right up until July 1893.S9
As these last examples suggest, merchant capital's
penetration of Ndebele and Shona economy and society did
not date only from the formal imposition o^ colonial rule.
Its roots were far longer and its effects were already .
well advanced by the early 189Os. In some places, merchant
capital co-existed from lengthy periods with established
forms and patterns of regional tra^.e, and it was the inter-
action of the two which promoted and shaped the spread of
Mashonaland, for instance,
commodity relations. Among the Duma of south-eastern/
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people living on the highveld who customarily exchanged
surplus crops for the artifacts and animal products of the
dry lowveld, expanded their grain production in the later
nineteenth century when their lowveld customers began offer-
ing European trade goods such as cloth, beads and salt which
they in turn had obtained through the sale of ivory and cattle
to traders from the south.60 Elsewhere the importance of
merchant capital varied greatly from region to region. In
parts of the north-east the centuries-old trade in gold and
other products with the Portuguese at Tete and other settle-
ments on the Zambesi was in an advanced state of decay by the
1880s. Even so, it was still sufficiently attractive for
entire villages to labour at goldwashing sites for several
months immediately before the planting season each year.
Gold won in this way was usually exchanged for beads, white
limbo and guns.61 This contrasted both with central Masho-
naland which remained relatively isolated 62, and with the
south-west where the Ndebele conducted an increasingly vigo-
rous trade first in ivory and later in cattle. At the height
of the ivory trade, which lasted from at least the beginning
of the 1850s until the end of the 1870s, Lobengula sold an
estimated thirty tons of tusks to traders over a three-year
period; while on one occasion alone during the peak years
of the cattle trade in the 1880s, c 2000 head were traded.63
These commodities, as well as one or two other products,
were exchanged for guns and horses, and for an ever-widening
range of goods which came to include 'blankets, limbo, tinder-
2O
boxes, knives and cutlery, needles, buttons, thread,
crockery, pipes, snuff-boxes, soap,sugar, even pictures
and umbrellas.161*
The consequences of merchant capital's advance were
as contradictory as the spread of commodity relations was
uneven. On the one hand, dominant classes among the Shona
and Ndebele were strengthened where they were able either
to deploy established political and social authority or
mobilise existing forms of wealth in order to concentrate
accumulation in their own hands as far as possible. Thus,
the rich, wapfumi, among the Duma expanded 'their wealth in
land, wives and crops through the acquisition of guns and
trade goods and (the making of) alliances with traders.165
Mzilikazi, Lobengula's predecessor, monopolised the ivory
trade to a considerable degree, the proceeds of which he
used partly to increase the volume of trade by intensifying
elephant hunting through the issue of guns to his hunters,
and partly to reward loyalists.66 In addition, the prestine
of both Ndebele kings, as well as of other local notables
extending all the way down to village headmen, was frequentlv
enhanced and flattered with 'presents1 from traders dependent
on their goodwill.6 7 On the other hand, by encouraqing
commodity production, by gradually dissolving existing social
relations, merchant capital tended to upset the balance within
and between indigenous class forces-Ga To take an Ndebele
example again, in the 1880s Lobengula's authority declined
relative to lesser notables who began to amass considerable
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private fortunes through sales of cattle.69 And as wealth
and the means of production, primarily livestock anc"
access to the best land, passed into fewer hands in Ndebele
and Shona societies alike, so those people threatened by
this process began to turn to labour migration. While the
very poor, such as those rendered desperate by drought,
probably became bondsmen or, more rarely, slaves, much as
others had done before them, for the slightly better-off
labour migration held, out the prospect of arresting or per-
haps even reversing their economic decline. For many, it
meant returning from the mines of Kimberley and later the
Rand with a gun, a few trade goods and the chance of. im-
proving their position. For all, it involved an escape,
however uncertain anc3 incomplete at first, from 'traditional1
authority and obligations.70 'It all tends to break un their
old notions*1 * Jameson was told in a letter which could
have applied to the Shona as much as it did to the Ndebele,
'so that the longer you can wait, the less compact will be
the organisation of the enemy you have to tackle.71
Jameson's patience, of course, had lasted only roughly
as long as it took to establish that the 'Second Rand1 was not
in Mashonaland. War had followed and then,as hopes of rich
gold discoveries in Matabeleland flared and flickered, both
the Chartered Company and the settlers turned to looting
the Shona and Ndebele economies. Between October 1893 and
and March 1896 anything from 100,000 to 200, ono cattle were
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seized from the Ndebele. Armed gangs of settlers arid
contingents of B.S.A. Police equipped with maxim guns, roamed
across the countryside, taking what they could. Although
the invaders were sometimes driven off by a show of force,
refusal to reveal where cattle were hidden could end in
death, as indeed it did for four women 'shot in cold blood*.
As raids of this kind missed too many cattle for the Company's
liking, in 1895 it began recruiting so-called native police
with the express intention of making 'the cattle levies more
efficient1. They were also to assemble forced labour for the
mines. By October-November 1895 Ndebele cattle holdings had
been reduced to an estimated 74,000 head, and over the next
three months these were almost halved again as the B.S.A.
Company quickened the pace of cattle confiscation.72
The collection of hut tax, first imposed 'illegally1
in May 1893, 73 was stepped up as well once imperial sanc-
tion was received in 1894. Its collection was 'arbitrarv
and irregular, appearing more like the levy of a tribute
than the collection of a civil tax', as marauding bands of
Native Department levies despoiled villages and districts
of their crops and livestock, when, for example, the Budya
people of the Mtoko district defied the Company's tax
collectors, they were attacked by a large Native Department
expedition. Villages and crops were burnt to the ground and
the tax seized in cattle and goats. Chief Gurunira himself
was fined additional cattle and 500 men were taken off to
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labour in the mines. In parts of Mashonaland livestock
became so scarce by the end of 189 5 that the Chartered
Administration decided to suspend the collection of tax .
for three months 'and that thereafter it should not be levied
in the form of stock "in view of the fact that at this rate
there would be no cattle left to collect in a year or two"1-71*
Forced labour also became widespread in this same period,
particularly from 1895 onwards. By then the demand for labour,
although small, constantly outstripped the tiny supply of
workers prepared to risk their lives for low wages in the
dangerous local mines. In both Mashonaland and Matabeleland
the resultant gap between demand and supply was closed as
far as possible with labour rounded up by the Native Depart-
ment. fI am forcing the natives of this district to work
sorely against their will1, reported the Native Commissioner
for Hartley, as were at least half the Native Commissioners
in districts elsewhere.75 All to often, this was accompan-
ied by violence, including the molestation and rape of
women.76 'When the white people started the place which
they call Selukwe1, recalled Nganganyoni Mhlope in 1938,
'the police used to come to our kraals ... and when they
recruited us they used to beat us'.77 Other interested
parties contributed their-particular skills too. Zulu
workers employed by the Tebekwe mine, for instance, were
given company rifles and were 'in the habit of raiding the
District for Boys and looting on their own account.|7e
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Less enterprising mines who turned to the B.S.A. Company
for help, came away with armed African guards for their
compounds79 and the knowledge that the Native Department
sympathised fully with their problems. 'If a bov will not
work, or tries to run away1., a visitor to the territory
was informed, 'the usual thing is to take him to the
native commissioner, and have him given twenty-five (lashes)
the word "twenty-five" said in English to any of the
boys was sufficient to make them grin in a sickly way - they
quite understood what it meant.160
The manner of capital's penetration thus provided a
growing number of Shona and Ndebele with ample cause to
resist. It did not, however,significantly subtract from
their capacity to fight. Merchant capital's patchy advance
had modified existing social relations without decisively
altering them, while neither the interests of speculative
capital nor the extremely limited resources of the Chartered
Administration required or permitted the profound transfor-
mation of indigenous social formations. Primitive accumulation
was largely confined to looting, leaving the struggle to
separate the direct producers from the means of production
very much to the future. A crucial consequence of this
simultaneity of process was that even as the outlines of new
patterns of accumulation and differentiation were sketched
by merchant capital, they were overlain by the impact of
primitive accumulation which, although uneven in its geo-
graphical incidence, oppressed all of the inhabitants in the
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areas which it affected. African polities/ then,although
becoming less autonomous, could still rea^ i.Tv muster the
political, social and ideological cohesion necessary to
resist the colonial net settling unevenly over them.
This was true even of Matabeleland, seemingly conquered
in 1893 and left prostrate before the self-styled 'fair-r
haired descendants of the northern pirates1.01 On the con-
trary, the overthrow of Lobengula had left the pattern of
Ndebele settlement, their institutions and structures basic-
ally intact- As the white hunter Selous later recognised,
'the fighting power and the military spirit of the Matabele
was only scotched, not killed.182 Outside of Bulawayo and
the main roads, the Chartered writ was fitful where it
existed at all, especially during 1894. By far the larger
part of the country continued to be administered. by,N(3ebele
chiefs, iziduna, who at first were preoccupied with the
need to select a successor to Lobengula. Although one of
Lobengula(s elder sons, Nyamanda, soon emerged as the
strongest candidate, he did not become king until June 1896
because of delays counselled by custom and lengthened by
political divisions contingent on the defection of a leading
induna, Gampu Sithole, to the whites. Nonetheless, as B.S.A.
Company raids for labour and cattle intensified in the course
of 1895 and early 1896, a series of secret meetings were
held at which plans and preparations were made for war.
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Opportunity presented itself when the Jameson Raid denuded
Chartered territory of police and troops, and a final provo-
cation delivered when rinderpest appeared and Company offi-
cials began shooting Ndebele cattle to contain its spread.
In the context of all that had gone before, the Ndebele mav
have mistaken 'the early quarantine measures, which were for
them draconian, for the final elimination of their cattle.1
Certainly general awareness of the intolerabi]ity of the
whole existing situation was accentuated by natural disaster
On the 20th March 1896 the Ndebele Rising began.83
Within ten days 'not a white man was left alive in the
outlying districts of Matabeleland1 8 *  . Survivors were
penned in laagers centred on Belingwe, Gwelo, Tuli and Bula-
wayo, from where they were powerless to stop the Mdebele,
'all jubilant and shouting now they would have the country
to themselves again', from looting stores and recapturing
their cattle.65 During April, the Ndebele tightened their
grip on much of the countryside, but even as they did so,
the initiative was already passing to the whites. Civil war
developed between the followers of Nyamanda and Ganpu, and
troops and reinforcements sent by the British Government and
the B.S.A. Company poured into Matabeleland. By June white
counter-attacks were well underway when news reached Bula-
wayo on the 16th that the Shona had risen.96 'To-day a
thunderclap has come1, wrote Baden-Powell. 'Telegrams from
Salisbury ... tell us of murders of whites in three widely
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separate parts of Mashonaland. It almost looks as though
the Matabele rebellion were repeating itself there. If
so, the outlook is very bad indeed.'87
Most of Mabhonaland's whites were taken completely by
surprise and in the first few desperate days of the
rising over one hundred settlers were killed. Laagers
were hastily thrown up around Salisbury, Umtali- and the
smaller towns, and stores and mines elsewhere abandoned
as their owners either fought their way through to the
main centres or were rescued'" by relief patrols. Trium-
phant Shona insurgents controlled the main roads between
Salisbury, Umtali and Hartley, and in some places made a
considerable effort to consolidate their hold.08 Drifts
used by waggons on the road to the Abercorn mine were
destroyed, trees were felled across it, and 'at several
places empty "bully beef" tins etc., (were) tied on strings
and placed across the road, evidently.to give notice of the
presence of anyone using the road at night.lfl9 To the
paramounts of central and western Mashdnaland, it seemed
that 'a successful return (had been made) to the old
world of Shona politics.190
It was precisely this 'old world of Shona politics1 which
crucially influenced the pattern of the Shona Rising. In
fact, it was not so much one rising or chimuvenga, as several
local uprisings, zvimuvenga. 91 The extremely uneven poli-
tical and economic impact of the Chartered intruders combined
with Shona diplomatic and political considerations to bring
about an extraordinarily complex and equally uneven response
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from Mashonaland1s various African polities. Some areas had
already been worsted in confrontations with the B.S.A.
Company stretching back through the previous six years. Others
had successfully resisted the Company's administrative preten-
sions and escalating tax and labour demands. For example,
in the Salisbury district itself, Kunzwi Nyandoro's people
capped their refusal to bow before the B.S.A. Company by
shooting at tax collectors in October 1895 and by threatening
to kill all police and whites in their district in April 1896.
But all of them, irrespective of how they had fared against
the Chartered Administration, continued to assess their op-
tions in other terms as well. Feuds between rival polities,
fears of an Ndebele revival, the lingering unity achieved
in past alliances such as that which had brought manv central
Shona rulers together against the Ndebele in 1889, all contri-
buted to the trajectory of the risings. There was certainly
no simple correlation between those areas which were subjec-
ted to the most intense colonial pressures and those areas
which rose.92
Consequently, when people in the fJmfuli district heard
news of Ndebele victories which encouraged them to resolve
their clashes with the local police once and for all, their
decision to rise 'triggered a "ripple effect" in which Shona
communities resisted or collaborated as the news reached
 :
them.'93 A large region stretching far to the north and east
of Umfuli, in some instances inspired by mediums of the Kaguvi
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and Nehanda mhondovo spirits, quickly joined in the fighting,
but the rest of the country decided otherwise and remained
neutral or actively collaborated with the whites. Among these
latter were the southern chieftairicies of Gutu, Zimuto, Chiri-
muhanzu, Matibi and Chivi, for whom the consequences of an
Ndebele victory seemed more serious than the severe colonial
pressures which they had already experienced. As a result,
the B.S.A. Company, again with the help of Imperial forces,
was able to concentrate its strength against selected Shona
rulers-91* In this way, Makoni, one of the leading paramounts,
was defeated and summarily executed in August 1896.9S Pound
about this point, too, hostilities very largely ceased in
Matabeleland where the Ndebele, short of grain and ammuni-
tion, were seduced by Rhodes1 promises made at a series of
indabas between August and October 1896.96 Although fortune
now swung decisively to the side of the whites as different
Shona groups were picked off one by one, remaining insur-
gents nonetheless rejected Company overtures and grimly
fought on. In December 1896 a police patrol along the Hunyani
river was dismissed by one leader with the remark that 'if
the white men would pav him hut-tax, he would allow them to
remain in Salisbury1.97 fI have nothing to talk to the white
man about1, said paramount chief Soswe in January 1897. 'Go
away and remain away'.98 Resistance therefore persisted in
various areas of Mashonaland for most of 1897 - 'you cannot
go 8 miles from here (Salisbury) without risking the chance
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of being potted at from a kopje1—9 until it was gradually
snuffed.out as the last centres were starved and dynamited
into surrender.
Although the Chartered Company had prevailed at the cost
of thousands of lives and millions of pounds, the combined
effect of its political and military adventures on Southern
Rhodesia's infant mining industry was disastrous. The fail-
ure of the Jameson Raid accentuated the collapse of the
financial boom on the Rand and the ensuing regional depression
was greatly aggravated by the impact of the Risings. As a
result, the flow of investment capital evaporated along with
the value of Rhodesian mining and development company shares.100
This ruin of the speculative bubble forced the B.S.A. Company,
to try, much more seriously this time, to foster genuine
mining activity. In short, the time had come to curb what
critics had slated as 'trading upon the unknown, this traffic
in fairy tales, this capitalisation of dreams.1101 The new
situation was to be one in which the large capitalist 'should
be encouraged, but only as a mining and industrial factor,
not as a speculator pure and simple.1102
For this, railway transport was essential and, where it
had previously resisted settler clamour for years, the Char-
tered establishment now authorised the speedy completion of
rail communication with the coast. The political and specu-
lative considerations which once had influenced where and
how fast the northern and'eastern railways were built were
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superseded in the period after 1896 by Southern Rhodesia's
urgent need for strategic and economic succour. The northern
line, the last 4OO miles of which were pushed ahead at the
startling rate of a mile a day, was opened to Bulawayo in
November 1897, and Umtali was finally linked to the East
Coast a year later. By the end of 1902, Salisbury had been
brought into the system and the two lines joined near Insiza.
As the B.S.A. Company had a pretty good idea of the region's
mineral potential, railway investments were pared to the
bone. The cost per mile of the system was much lower than
was usual in South Africa and most British African colonies
as track followed watersheds and avoided heavy engineering
works whevever possible. Even the bridges were temporary,
and the end result impressed travellers as a 'crooked,
wandering, flimsy-looking structure.'103
Flimsy-locking or not, the railways arrival sparked off
a frenzied if shortlived outburst of speculation. Newcomers
discovered that the 'element of speculation ... permeates
everything'. 'When I was in Umtali', wrote one traveller,
'there was a persistent rumour that Mr. Rhodes ... was ser-
iously ill. It sent Chartered shares down at once, and I
met an excited man who had come in from some distance away
to wire instructions to Johannesburg to sell his shares at
once. "I bought as many as I could", he said, "in anticipa-
tion of the boom in Bulawayo when the railway.reaches there,
but if Rhodes should die they will drop to Heaven knows what,
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and I can't risk it"1.101* 'There was one subject of. con-
.versation in Fort Victoria which overshadowed all others1,
recalled an inhabitant of the time. This was 'the Boom, the
great wave of prosperity which was going to sweep over the
town, and repay everyone for the trials and struggles of the
past.1*05 It was most apparent in commerce and the building
trades - Bulawayo somewhat fancifully became known as the
'City of Palaces1 as government offices, clubs, churches,
schools, hotels and municipal and company buildings sprang
up in every direction106 - but was shared to some extent
by the mining industry as well, where spokesmen came forward
with smooth words of explanation for the industry's past
dismal record and exciting future prospects.
But while the immediate effect of railway construction
was to provide occasion and excuse for financial and commer-
cial speculation of greater or lesser novelty, its long-term
significance was very different. The provision of cheap and
regular transport also marked the effective beginnings of a
new stage in which industrial capital rapidly grew in impor-
tance. Transport rates came tumbling down from the unbearable
levels of £200 and more per ton to which they had been driven
by rinderpest, making feasible for the first time the import,
of mining plant on a large scale. In the same period encour-
agement of another kind came from a belated attempt by the
Administration to enforce the terms of the 1895 Mines and
Minerals Act which sought to end the speculative holding of
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thousands of mining claims, and after one or two false
starts, the industry at long last commenced production. In
September 1898 the Geelong, soon to be followed by other
mines, began a regular output of gold. Until that point,
Southern Rhodesia's capitalist mining industry had produced
less than 7000 ozs. of gold, but in 1899 alone over 65000 02s
were won, and by 1902 annual production had climbed to
nearly 200 000 ozs. 1 0 7
No sooner had the mining industry clambered precariously
to its knees, however, than it was once more threatened,
this time by the outbreak of the South African War in October
1899. Railway communication with the south was disrupted,
and as rising transport and mining costs stretched the finan-
cial resources of nearly all companies to breaking-point, it
became increasingly difficult for the industry to sustain-its
top-heavy structure. Large sections of it were moribund,
paralysed by the conflicting need to confiscate claims and
curb speculation without frighteneing off fresh capital.108
Such v/orking capital as there was tended to be completely
inadequate 1 0 9 and incompetent management was rife. 'Manage-
ments have been amateurish1, lamented the Chartered Company's
secretary, 'and for one reason and another circumstances have
tended to bring together a business community of far smaller
average brain power than exists on the Rand.'110 Most
companies were over-capitalised through speculation, through
reservation of shares for the B.S.A. Company and through the
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practice of floating subsidiary companies to raise extra
cash.111 But above all, the war precipitated a major crisis
between mining capital and black labour.
Once the mines had begun the slow and uneven
of subordinating speculative to productive capital, of jrovino
away from share market dealing towards the actual production
of gold, profitability came to depend crucially on abundant
supplies of cheap labour. As early as 1895, provincial labour
bureaux were formed, along with a central compound in Bulawayo
to direct the flow of labour to the mines. This first ini-
tiative failed because of the general indifference shown by
most companies, and because of heavy financial losses and the
impact of the Risings.112 A second attempt was made in 1S99
when the Labour Board of Southern Rhodesia was established,
again in two provincial sections. This was rather more succ-
essful, supplying over 6000 workers to Matabeleland mines
alone in the last six months of 1899. Far more important,
though, was the volume of labour supplied by the Native
Department.113 During 1898 and 1899 the size of the produce
market open to black agriculturalists was restricted by
companies railing some food supplies up from the south
 m
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The degree of independence thus enjoyed by the mines from
peasant production had two effects. It produced a small sup-
ply of workers who had no other means of meeting their own
and the state's cash requirements. It also le.ft the Native
Department free to raise huge contingents of forced labour.
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These levies, together with the Labour Board's contribution
were undoubtedly instrumental in the fall of average mine
wages from almost forty shillings per month in 1897 to
twenty-two shillings by early 19OO.lls But when the war
stopped the import of foodstuffs from South Africa, it thrust
the mines back into full dependency on peasant grain nrn^uc-
tion. This in turn made forced labour itself somewhat more
problematic because of the disruption it would cause^to the
agricultural cycle, while the larger market also reduced the
number of people who had no alternative to wage employment.
In several areas peasant production was already of
considerable significance by the turn of the century. The
looting carried out by the settlers and the Chartered Company,
as well as the devastation caused in the Risings and by
rinderpest, had disturbed and in some cases destroyed pat-
terns of indigenous accumulation, but had not arrested the
process of commodity production- On the contrary, it was
accelerated both where people tried to recoup their losses and
by commerce's impelling need to expand into the rural areas.
The ' same reckless haste1 and speculative extravagance had
been displayed by merchant companies in the establishment of
large warehouses and shops in the country's towns and villa-
ges as had been shown by their counterparts in the mining
industry in the palmy days of 1894-5.. Manv of these ventures,
hopelessly over-capitalised and overstaffed, found it extreme-
ly difficult to survive in"the over-traded conditions which
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prevailed in the towns after the Risings. Despite the
temporary fillip occasioned by railway construction, several
firms abandoned the struggle and went into liquidation.
Others, though, discovered their salvation in the !native
trade1 and by the end of the nineteenth centurv the 'best
business was done in Kaffir goods, which were sold in whole-
sale quantities to the traders living outside the towns.1
Typically, traders1 stock consisted of 'cheap white or
coloured calicoes (called limbo), salt, beads, and brass
wire, and the natives paid for these commodities with grain,
either whole or hand-ground into meal1. The trader, noted
one acute observer of the Southern Rhodesian scene, 'always
preferred to pay for the grain with the goods in his store
rather than with cash, and to receive grain instead of cash
in payment of the goods he sold as thereby he gained a
double profit1. The result was a rapid increase in the
number of traders, most of whom were 'partly or entirely
financed by the large commercial houses'.116
of "
The proliferation /trying stores simultaneously encour-
aged and was encouraged by Hdebele and Shona determination
to engage in trade. Cultivators in the Insiza district
planted a variety of crops in 1897 'considerably in excess
of their own requirements with the express intention of
trading.'117 Much the same occurred in Mashonaland a little
later on. 'I have heard that certain natives in this
district are intending planting considerably more grain this
season than in former years1, wrote the NC for Mazoe in 1899. 8
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From Mrewa it was reported that 'every year the Natives are
increasing their lands so as to have a certain quantity of
grain to trade1, 119 -while around Salisbury where grain pro-
duction had also expanded, it was 'quite the usual thing for
a Native to have Three Gardens. The first he will tell you
is for his year's food. The second to make beer of : the
third for trade1.120 Still greater strides were made in
south-western Mashonaland where the headstart gained by
those regions which had stayed out of the Risings was turned
to advantage in the race to meet the large and profitable
market created by mines starting up in the neighbour .in*™
Selukwe district. 'This year has been a year in every way
for the Natives, they have prospered and the VThiteman has
not1, observed Fort Victoria's civil commissioner in 1898.
'The Native Makalaka... have traded all their surplus grain
at considerable advantage to themselves... (and) have done
very well with their sheep and cattle.1121 So well in fact
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that by 1900 the expanding demand for grain at the Selukwe
mines was 'gradually having the effect of placing the natives
... on the high road to prosperity1.122 One year later,
their success was being duplicated in more and more parts of
the country as the consequences of the South African VTar !nade
themselves felt. 'Owing to the interruption of railway
communication with the South and the high price of grain
occasioned by the war1, reported Matabeleland's CNC 'the
natives have been able to trade their grain at a considerable
profit.'1*3
People who could 'trade their grain at a considerable
profit1 were unwilling to work on the mining industry's terms,
and the labour supply, already uncertain in the months before
the war because of falling wages and the high death rate
from accidents and disease, now worsened dramaticallv. The
Gutu district, for example, many of whose men had worked and
died on the Selukwe mines, switched with alacrity from provi-
ding labour to exporting grain. Where the district had once
yielded many thousands of labourers, after 1900 'it supplied
so few workers that NCs were shy of providing figures at all'^
In Matabeleland, where the prevailing high prices paid for
grain encouraged bigger harvests, the labour supply was corres
pondingly smaller.125 'The natives are agriculturalists1,
commented one official, 'and do not view the prospect of
becoming miners with any enthusiasm. Their present occupa-
tion... pays better and is a irore pleasant life.'126 Nor
could local mines always rely on labour from those areas
which were either unsuited to extensive grain production or
too remote from produce markets. People in the Bulalima-
Mangwe region who were used to the higher wages of the Trans-
vaal, refused to work on Rhodesian mines when the Rand, closed
down at the start of the war. 'The supply of labour on the
whole has been extremely poor1, concluded the NC. 'In
fact the attitude of the Natives has amounted to an absolute
strike.1127
Reinforcing both of these reasons for rejecting mine
work was the hostility felt towards the mining industry as
the cause and symbol of the country's colonial subjugation.
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For all that the Chartered Company might warn African
leaders that 'they might as well understand once and for
all that this is a whiteman's country and that the white
man's object was to get the gold out of the "ground1,128
there were always some who withheld their assistance if thev
possibly could. 'The grown up people look upon the discovery
of gold as the cause of the loss of their country to them-
selves1/ explained the missionary Prestage. 'They are unwil-
ling to cooperate in the develonment of what they consider
their great misfortune. No doubt this impression teJIs also
of the young men.1129 Shona insurgents, too, specifically
objected to settler exploitation of the country's "old. Two
white prospectors whose camp was surrounded by followers of
the 'rebel1 Mapondera, recalled the demands and remarks flung
at them: 'Who gave us permission to come up and wash gold
and sink pits? The gold was theirs; .the district was theirs;
they did not want anyone in the country sinking shafts "manodi11
Curses on the English at Salisbury1.130
Thus confronted and frustrated inside Southern Rhodesia,
mining capital was obliged to look elsewhere for its labour-
needs. Sporadic attempts were made to obtain workers from
across the Zambesi, but these first efforts frequently ended
in failure. A 'large number of Barotses and Zambesis1 re-
cruited in mid-1901 'caused a heavy loss to the companies
engaging them. The expenses of bringing them down and getting
them to the mines amounted to upwards of £2 per hea'd, but owing
4O
to the absence of any pass regulations ... the natives deser-
ted in large numbers month by month with absolute impunity.1
1 3 1
 As the Chartered Administration lacked the means at
this point either to tap northern labour reservoirs system-
atically or to contain the high desertion rate, it instead
instituted a desperate and exotic search for indentured la-
bour in the Red Sea area, and rather more predictably, for
Indian and, later on, Chinese workers,132 None of these
schemes were successful, and the industry's problems ballooned
when in swift succession the Labour Board collapsed under
the weight of excessive administrative charges and provincial
rivalry, and the British Secretary of State for the Colonies
barred NCs from involvement in labour recruitment.133 Bv
early 1903 it was estimated that the demand for labour exceeded
supply by some twenty five percent.131*
Lack of labour affected the mines in a number of ways.
If they weren't forced to close down completely, plants were
run well below capacity which pushed .up working expenses and
eroded profitability. The Globe and Phoenix mine, which
was responsible for a large proportion of Southern Rhodesia's
gold output, operated in fits and starts throughout 1901 and
the early part of 19O2. Its future success, reported the
mine, depended to a great extent on a solution to the labour
problem, 'as with an inadequate supply the working expenses
increase roughly 15 percent'.135 Mines which tried to reduce
their labour needs by mechanising underground work also found
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that their costs went up. The experience of the Criterion
mine was typical. An air compressor erected 'because of the
uncertainty of the native labour market1 was expected to
'add to the mining cost, as the reefs are rather small to
allow machine drills to work economically.1136 Particularly
worrying for the industry as a whole was that wages began to
rise as individual mines sought to attract and retain what
labour was available. From twenty two shillings per month
at the start of 1900, wages increased to roughly -thirty
shillings in March 1901 and to over forty shillings a year
later.137
Attempts by mining capital to reduce wages stirred up an
unprecedented degree of worker resistance, includino strike
action. Although not unknov/n, strikes and work stoppages
had previously been rare on Rhodesian mines. In 1895 Shona
labourers on a small mine refused to work on night shifts
arbitrarily introduced by their employer, and in 1899 miners
at Selukwe 'struck work until they could be given the foo^.
they had been promised1.138 At the Sable Hill mine in 1898
management interference with workers' private possessions
brought the mine to a standstill. 'On a certain day1, repor-
ted the investigating official, 'Mr Bennet, h^rlTNT noticed
that meal etc was being wasted went through t*a. vit of one
lot of boys
 ;and found some candles, matches, & "ieal which
they ought not have had in their possession, nn ^oin^ to a
second hut, the boys came up brandishing "kerries:i &
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speaking very excitedly, saying they had bought the things
in Salisbury. Mr. Bennet thinking that he had better not
interfere further because he was unarmed and alone, went
away.'139 As defiance of any kind was usually promptly and
severely checked - in the case just cited the two 'ring-
leaders' were 'punished' and the rest reprimanded by the
NC, after which they were all 'paid to date and dismissed1
- black workers quickly appreciated that discontent was more
safely expressed in less direct ways. Forced labour, harsh
discipline and armed compound guards were countered by
'desertion, disobedience, absence without leave, malingering
and the like.ll(|° At the Geelong mine, for example, someone
with a grievance against the company hit back by killing
one of its oxen. The ox 'was found dead in the kraal and
... on the beast being cut open and examination made it was
found that a piece of rough stick about six inches long and
rather pointed at both ends had been forced up its fundamental
orifice and injured the intestines etc", thus causing death.1
'I made every endeavour to discover the perpetrator of this
outrage', concluded the local NC, 'but up to the present
have failed to do so.'11*1 A determined 'go-slow1 in 1899
by African miners on the Red and White Rose mine, where con-
ditions shocked even hardened members of the Native Depart-
ment, drove the management to despair. 'Many of them cro
underground and simply will not make any attempt to work ...
Merely refusing to give the boys tickets for the shifts wasted
is useless and is of no value to us', complained the mine
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manager.11*2
But as the supply of labour worsened after the turn
of the century, so the bargaining position of black workers
improved. Defiance became more open, not least because a
considerable proportion of the African workforce now com-
prised experienced miners who had been on the Rand before
the outbreak of war. They were singularly unimpressed with
Rhodesian wage rates and even when wages were rising in 19OO,
communicated their dissatisfaction to other mineworkers. • Any
moves by mineowners to evade or withhold what the workers
regarded as their due, were countered by direct action.
When the Blanket mine failed to provide its workers with
enough meat on Christmas day 1902, the ensuing disturbance
'culminated in police intervention and the arrest of four
miners.1 Workers at the Imani mine were no less assertive in
similar circumstances. They 'refused to work on the 26th
December, as they had received no present of meal on Christ-
mas Day. There was no brawling; the natives simply left the
compound and went into the bush? the next day they resumed
work as usual.1 And when mineowners reduced wages in Novem-
ber and December 1901, workers took immediate counter-action.
Matabeleland's labour supply, little enough as it was, 'fell
off so markedly that the old wage rates had to be re-introduced
within a matter of weeks.1 At the Dunraven mine starting pay
was cut-'but as the natives would not work for more than one
month, the wages were again raised to the usual scale',
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while at the nearby Camperdown mine 'all the natives . . .
refused work, and left the mine in consequence of the recent
reduction of wages. After some difficulty they were per-
suaded to return to work, the wages havina been again raised
to the old rates. 'l **3
Because nost mines •could not afford to run the risk
of adopting a reduced scale of wage, as the margin of profit
was so small that it did not allow of their running the risk
of stopping the batterv#llu* mining capital was forced to
back down. Wages were left untouched, e^ r»n t^u^h marginal
mines were closing and profits falling on those still working
Meanwhile, sentiment in the London mone" ^ ^ o t had hardened:
'The argument of the thinking man in the city is this: "You
have in Rhodesia say ten mines trying to produce gold an^. pay
dividends ... (but) not one of these ten milling companies
has been able to run for twelve months without having to hang
up the whole or some part of their (crushing) stamps for
want of labour to keep the mill going, and development ahead
of the mill .. . Show me that the labour can be obtained and
then we will see about the capital" f . x k 5 The London Wall
headquarters of the 3.S.A. Company, although it continued to
manipulate the market whenever it could1*6, privately con-
curred. 'Want of money for the mines', later stressed the
Company's secretary, 'has been induced b** want of labour.'11*7
Mining capital's crisis magnified its other problems.
The many rights and fees reserved to the B.S.A. Company
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under the mining law weighed more heavily on the industrv
in its weakened state then they had done in its profligate
youth, and the resulting discontent, swelled by the Admini-
stration's inability to resolve the labour problem, found
expression in opposition to Company rule.11*8 Early in 19O2
the B.S.A. Company was attacked in the widely-read Mining
Journal which argued that the Company had 'failed to attract
settlers, and mining adventurers have certain.?" been deterred
by the extortionate system of royalties'. 'If any gold disco-
veries were made which precipitated a rush into "Jiodesia1,
predicted the Journal, 'no free mining community would
submit without bloodshed to the exactions of their present
landlord ... The success of the Colony would inevitably
mean the sweeping away of the Company.'1U9 As similar senti-
ments were shared by many in the settler electorate, all of
the candiates returned from the mining province of Matabe-
leland in the Legislative Council elections one month later
were opposed to the continuation of the Chartered Administration
The forum occupied by mining capital in 1902 was a key
part of the administrative and political reconstruction
imposed on the B.S.A. Company by the Imperial Government in
the aftermath of the Jameson Raid and the Risings. Left
to their own devices, Rhodes and Jameson had created a waste-
land in the north of smouldering villages and burnt-out
farm houses, while in South Africa their intervention had
enormously aggravated the very divisions and suspicions
which British policy and, indeed, Rhodes himself, had
'•• .--1
i:--•»'•! .:i
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formerly been at pains to allay. The policy of the past
decade whereby Imperial interests were secured through
support for the ambitions of the Cape and of Rhodes in parti-
cular had been revealed as bankrupt, forcing Britain to
intervene in order to contain the Shockwaves detonated by
the spectacular climax to the whole reckless and impatient
Rhodesian adventure.150 The Chartered Company was promptly
stripped of independent control over its military and police
forces and placed under the surveillance of a Resident
Commissioner answerable only to the High Commissioner for
South Africa.
The fact, however, of the British Colonial Secretary's
own complicity in the intrigues against the South African
Republic was a significant indication that the old assumptions
on which Imperial policy had been based were breaking down.
The Transvaal was rapidly outstripping the wealth and power
of the Cape, Natal and Rhodesia combined. Thus while the
failure of the Raid was most embarassing politically for
Britain, both the Colonial Secretary's interventionist
sympathies and the weight of British patriotic opinion, out-
raged by the German Kaiser's congratulatory telegram to
President Kruger of the Transvaal, precluded drastic action
being taken against the B.S.A. Company. Nor was the Treasury
keen to assume the considerable expense which the administration
of Mashonaland and Matabeleland would involve. 'At all costs,'
urged Lord Selborne, 'we must ... steer clear of saddling on
. . ' • *
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Her Majesty's Government any responsibility in the public
mind, direct or indirect, for the finances of the B.S.A.
Company.llsl in any case, a3ded South Africa's new High
Commissioner, Lord Milner, 'Treasury principles wouid starve
Rhodesia - that is one great reason for keeping the Company
up.'152
But even though the Charter was left basically intact,
'decent government1, as Milner put it, was vital. 'Peace
and order are absolutely essential.1 Southern Rhodesia
'must settle down now, for another couple of years wasted
over native troubles will retard development, make the
Company bankrupt and', he warned London, 'throw an impecunious
undeveloped country bigger than France upon your hands.1153
The B.S.A. Company, too, had concluded that its future inter-
ests would best be realised through the establishment of an
efficient, responsible administration. Quite apart from its
other consequences, the * jolly, reckless spirit of adventure,
which aims at making a million in half an hour and then
clearing home to Piccadilly',lSh had produced an utterly chaotic
administrative situation. 'Everything official here is in an
absolutely rotten condition1, observed William Milton, the
Company's Chief Secretary, shortly after his arrival in September
1896.15S 'Between outselves1, wrote Milner to Joseph
Chamberlain, the British Colonial Secretary, '(administratively)
it is a bad story. On the one hand, land was alienated in the
most reckless manner to Companies and individuals, on the other
hand a lot of unfit people were allowed to exercise.power,
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or at any rate did exercise it, especially with regard to the
natives, in a manner which cannot be defended ... an3 the
rebellion was largely due to it. Now the Company ... recognize
this themselves - they almost admit it - and they are certainlv
trying to get things -ri^ht, ' 1 5 6
Milton himself, who later became Administrator, was
specifically recruited from the Cape Civil Service by Rhodes
to create system and order out of the prevailing anarchy
in Southern Rhodesia. 'Zealous in his duty, well versed in
official business. . . . the same type of man as rises to the
head of Civil departments in England1, he smoothly incorpor-
ated Milner's instructions and advice into an overall reorga-
nisation of the administrative structure.157 By the end of
1897, much to Milner's satisfaction, a 'complete system of
administration departmentally organised1 was in place, an>1
the following year 'proper civil service regulations were
drawn up and put into force.'138 At Imperial insistence,
'native policy' and the Native Department were singled out
for special attention. The 1898 Or^er in Council stipulated
that 'from time to time1 the S.C.A. Company was to 'assign
to the natives ... land sufficient for their occupation ...
and suitable for their agricultural and pastoral requirements'.
It also precluded the Legislative Council from imposing any
conditions or disabilities not equally applicable to whites
on blacks without the previous consent of the British
Secretary of State. In addition, Native Department personnel.
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their powers, duties, even the districts they were posted to,
and indeed 'all questions of native administration1 passed
under Imperial control.159
Anxious as the Imperial authorities were to establish
the framework for a 'sound native policy1, they were still
more concerned to arrest the slide of southern African hegemony
away from Britain towards the Transvaal. They wanted to
win what Milner called 'the South African game all round116°.
The extent and nature of British intervention, therefore,
was significantly circumscribed by two considerations.
'Nothing is more certain', explained the High Commissioner,
'than that if the Imperial Government were to be seen taking
a strong line against the Company for the protection of the
blacks, the whole of Dutch opinion in South Africa would
swing round to the side of the Company and the bulk, of ...
British Colonial opinion would go with it.'161 It had also
to be reconciled with the Imnerial Government's political
strategy of preparing Southern Rhodesia's settlers for even-
tual self-government an<? ultimate absorption into a South
African federation. Here too, Milner appreciated that the
most likely source of 'conflict between local opinion ...
and the views of the Imperial Government is the native
question.'162 Deference to settler sensitivities in prac-
tice meant that the hard content of British policy was
sacrificed to style. As the 'great thing' was to obtain
the appointment 'of honourable and capable men as magistrates
and native commfssioners1, existing discriminatory "laws,
5O
notably those controlling blacks in urban areas, were, conso-
lidated but not repealed. 'The successful government of
natives', it was claimed, 'even under the most settled con-
ditions is rather a question of men rather than of regulat-
ions, but where administration is still in an enbrvonic stage
as it is in Rhodesia, the character of the administration
is of yet more predominant influence,1 There was little in
this approach which offended the Chartered Administration,
and from the beginning of the exercise both Milton and Rhodes,
the latter somewhat chastene^d by his encounters with the
Ndebele in the Matopos,'showed a great disposition to accept1
Milner's suggestions on this 'difficult and most important
question of the Native Commissioners.'163
For quite opposite reasons, the Imperial Government
and Rhodes also found themselves in agreement over the issue
of settler political representation. The British Government
favoured representation because it wanted to tailor constitu-
tional development to fit Southern Rhodesia's eventual entrv
into a South African federation. It also wished to provide
settlers with an arena where they could contest Comoany
policies. They were to constitute an additional check on
its freedom of action.161* There was the risk,of course, which
Milner recognised, that 'this representative Council will
simply be Rhodes, even more completely than the Company is1,
and not surprisingly it was precisely this possibility which
attracted Rhodes. 'Rhodes- is going for it "hot and strong",
avowedly with the object of strengthening his own position
51
in any differences with the Imperial Government1, reported
Milner. 'They may bully the Company, he says frankly, but
they won't dare to bully a representative Council.'165
Certainly the results of the first elections in April 1899
seemed to vindicate Rhodes' confidence. In Mashonaland,
the candidate topping the poll was 'intimately associated
with members of the Company's Board and administration1,
while one of Matabeleland1s victors, Hans Sauer, was closely
linked to Rhodes.166 And whenever possible, the B.S.A,
Company played on these amenable instruments. 'Your cable
saying that the High Commissioner wishes you to postpone
the introduction of your Labour and Hut Tax Ordinances has
come as a great shock to us1, wrote V?ilson Fox to Milton
in 1901. 'To say we are to wait for the general settlement
of South Africa when we are starving for labour is like
telling a starving man that there will be plenty of bread
after he is dead. . However, as we have now got a Legislative
Council we may as well have some of the sweets of it as well
as the sour, and our particular Sauer will bring in the
Bills if you do not, and fortunately we cannot stop him1.167
Southern Rhodesia, said a letter to the press, was a 'blighted
desert of Chartered hirelings1, where you 'think and vote
with the Rhodes party ... or lose your situation.'168
For every occasion that the elected members of the
Legislative CounciJ voted 'with the Rhodes party1, though,
52
there were others where they exhibited a disconcerting
independence of spirit. Rhodes himself, much as he valued
the Legislative Council as a buffer between the B.S.A.
Company and the Imperial Government, never thought of it
in exclusively instrumentalist terms. Local representation
"was in fact the minimum price which Rhodes and the Company
had to pay in order to re-allign the majority of settlers
with the Chartered adventure. Infuriated by the Company's
•failure to protect them and their families1 in 1896,l69
most settlers were convinced of the Administration's folly
and incompetence. Demands for greater settler participation
in government were loudly advanced in Salisbury and supported
in Bulawayo where a public meeting unanimously resolved that
the •gaol should be cleared of all its occupants and the
Administrator and other members of the Government take their
places1.170 A large part of this protest was soon enough
muffled" by the promptness with which the B.S.A. Company
paid compensation for losses during the Risings, 1 7 1 but
positive support was only recaptured when Rhodes publicly
conceded the settlers1 right to a'voice in the affairs of
the country1. From the end of 1896 his speeches appealed
to a future where there would be a 'semi-responsible body;
that was to say, certain elective members in the Council,
and finally complete self-government'. As the settlers
•could not expect to have a majority of votes in the Council
unless they were prepared to pay the expenditure1, for the
moment they should be content with some representation
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'and through their representatives point out any abuses,
preparing for the time when they would have full self-
government1 . x 7 2 If the Company seriously meant to take
'this excellent course1, commented the Rhodesia Herald,
'we are far from desiring the abrogation of the Charter,
which if suitably modified will provide a golden mean between
Imperial red tape and unrestrained financial tyranny and
selfishness. Our aim is, after all, sound and wise
government•.17 3
Settler participation in the political process, then,
promised more than occasional cooperation with the Admini-
stration suggested, and became- still more unpredictable
as the old equation of Company and pioneers dissolved in
the second half of the 189Os. This occurred in two over-
lapping stages. When the Chartered state tried to promote
lasting economic development - the interests of capital in
general - through intervention against speculative capital
and by support for productive enterprises, a certin cleavage
opened up between the B.S.A. Company and the many large
concerns unwilling or unable to adjust to the new era. At
first, it was these latter 'settler' interests which were
voiced in the Legislative Council, in 1899, for instance,
elected members of the Council, all of whom had 'close
connections with the large land-owning companies', opposed
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legislation which obliged absentee landlords to occupy their
lands beneficially;171* while in 1902 the Council's newly-
elected representatives were extremely critical of the burden
placed on development companies by the Administration's
mining laws, and even of Chartered rule itself. By this time,
however, settler society, although never simply an undiffer-
entiated mass of adventurers,had become noticeably fractured
along lines of class and interest. Consequently, the stance
adopted against the Land Ordinance in 1899 by the Council's
elected members placed them in opposition not only to the
B.S.A. Company but also to small settler farmers and their
•independent1 allies - generally lawyers, merchants and
others not directly employed by big companies - for whom--
the speculative holding of land was an obstacle to the
country's progress.
In fact it was this quite different segment of the tiny
settler society who snatched up the opposition baton from
mining capital in the latter part of 1902. Their various
economic grievances aside, an emotional link tying many
settlers to the Charter had snapped with Rhodes' death in
March 1902, and in the context of the Peace of Vereeniging
at the end of the South African War both accentuated
speculation about Southern Rhodesia's political future. In
August, a crowded public meeting of the Bulawayo Literary
and Debating Society, 'a respected institution to which the
majority of Bulawayo's leading figures belonged1, had as
its motion the abrogation of the B.S.A. Company's Charter.
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British instinct, declared Charles Coghlan, afterwards leader of the
campaign for responsible government, recoiled from a Chartered
institution. The Company's economic record and present
policies were bitterly criticised for favouring large and
frequently unproductive capital, and the motion was carried
with acclamation.1751 All of this was most embarrassing for
large capital whose entrenched positions had come under fire.
The companies hastily proclaimed that while the community's
grievances were serious, they were nonetheless 'capable of
remedy1 under the existing system. Fearful of unrestricted
competition from the Rand for labour supplies, the Rhodesia
Chamber of Mines warned that 'annexation to either the Trans-
vaal or the Cape would have a disastrous effect on the
progress and prosperity of Rhodesia1. The mining industry,
concluded the Chamber, would be 'best maintained and
fostered under the Charter until the white community has
increased to such an extent as to enable it to demand self-
government ' .17 G
This belated attempt to calm Southern Rhodesia's
troubled waters made little impact, and when the directors
of the B.S.A. Company arrived on a tour of inspection in
September 1902, they found an 'embittered country1.177 Large
mining capital, even if it shied away from ending Chartered
Company rule, was still anxious for changes in the mining
law; such economies as it had implemented, along with the
post-war depression generally, had created a new constituency
of unemployed prospectors and miners discharged by contrac-
tors, and they too turned to the Charter for redress178 ;
commerce was also depressed; and even the minuscule .white
56
agricultural interest which had benefitted from the war-time
exclusion of southern foodstuffs, now complained angrily about
high railway rates. Major demands put to the directors thus
focussed on the mining law's restrictions, on the old and
vexatious question of the percentage of shares reserved for
the B.S.A. Company, on railway rates and the high cost of
living, as well as on the small number of elected Legislative
Council members.
In the event, most of them were conceded. The conjuncture
of mining capital's labour crisis, its unwieldy structure and
manifest unprofitability, and the growth of settler opposition
to Company government left the directors with little choice.
Legislation was revised to allow small mines to work for a
profit without being floated as companies; the Company's-
share of vendor's scrip was formally reduced from fifty to
thirty per cent; and railway rates were adjusted and reduced
in some instances.. The directors also agreed to raise the
number of elected Legislative Council representatives to
equal the number of nominated members. It was a move
deliberately designed to defuse the more extravagant settler
political movements179 and to associate influential white
residents in the economic and legislative policies of
reconstruction. 'We do need their assistance1, explained
the Company's secretary, 'and want it to be given
ungrudgingly'. u °
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